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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If value pluralism is true, does it provide support for liberalism?  
Isaiah Berlin famously thought that this question should be answered 
affirmatively.  Berlin’s protean idea has spawned an interesting 
discussion in contemporary political theory, as a number of thinkers 
have engaged with one or another aspect of the value pluralism-
liberalism connection.  John Gray and John Kekes have, in quite 
different ways, affirmed the idea of value pluralism while denying any 
strong link between it and liberal political morality.1  On the other hand, 
William Galston and George Crowder have provided comprehensive and 
powerful expositions of liberalism claiming a supportive relationship 
with value pluralism.2  This essay criticizes the view that value pluralism 
provides philosophical support for liberalism.  I have no objection to 
register here against the terms of liberal political morality, or to the 
general idea of identifying paths of philosophical support for it.3  
However, I want to raise a number of questions about value pluralism in 
its relation to liberalism, and about specific lines of argument advanced 
by Crowder and Galston in support of their positive view of the 
connection.  These questions are critical in impact—at least if correct—
but do not proceed from a position advocating an alternative to the basic 
terms of liberal political morality.  My more modest aim is one of 
provoking elaboration and clarification of certain key aspects of the 
value pluralism-liberalism relation by means of questioning it. 
After a few terminological preliminaries in Part II, I turn to two 
primary tasks.  First, in Part III, I raise questions that seem to me to 
confront the basic logic of the connection between value pluralism and 
liberalism.  Second, in Part IV, I discuss at length the “argument from 
diversity” articulated by George Crowder in support of the view that 
value pluralism supports liberalism.4  This line of argument is only one 
of a number that Crowder advances in support of that view, and so 
doubts about its success do not necessarily implicate the other lines of 
argument he pursues.  However, the argument from diversity is a 
 
 1. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 61–62 (1996); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF 
PLURALISM 199–203 (1993). 
 2. GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM 148–70 (2004); 
GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 135–57 (2002) [hereinafter 
CROWDER, LIBERALISM]; WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 154, 
187 (2005) [hereinafter GALSTON, PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM]; WILLIAM A. GALSTON, 
LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 4 (2002) [hereinafter GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: IMPLICATIONS]. 
 3. The argument here is thus not part of a more general antifoundationalism in 
political theory. 
 4. CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 135–59. 
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particularly interesting and prevalent form of argument in defense of 
liberalism—in the form of the “spatial” argument referred to later—and 
hence, I trust, worth the extensive and exclusive attention given it here. 
II.  PRELIMINARIES 
I want to start with a few definitions and analytical distinctions that 
will prove helpful as a means of shorthand in the ensuing discussion.  
First, as per my title, I want to think about the path between value 
pluralism and liberalism, as opposed to thinking in terms of the path 
from value pluralism to liberalism.  The traffic of ideas runs both ways, 
though it is common to think of the philosophy—value pluralism—as 
foundational to, or “underneath,” liberalism.  I do not view traffic from 
liberalism to value pluralism as in need of regulation or restriction, 
though I do affirm the traditional idea that the truth or falsity of a 
philosophical thesis cannot be established by examining the political 
implications of that thesis.  But, like most of the political theorists who 
think and write about the value pluralism-liberalism connection—
including Isaiah Berlin—I am not fundamentally interested in 
conducting inquiry into the pure philosophical question of value 
pluralism.  Content, then, to proceed with thinking from the base of “if 
value pluralism is correct, what follows for politics,” I am curious as 
well about the traffic of ideas in the other direction.  I will not pursue 
that curiosity in this essay, but note here that value pluralism seems like 
a philosophy of value especially well-suited to liberal political 
arrangements, perhaps even to the point of sparking some suspicion that 
it might, at the end of the day, appear to be essentially liberal political 
arrangements dressed in the garb of value theory at the level of 
philosophy.  It might, that is, simply be liberalism redescribed, rather 
than being a theory independent of liberalism that might support it.  I am 
curious about that possibility, though also disturbed at the possibility of 
its truth.  Still, I can recognize that thinkers like John Dewey and 
Richard Rorty, certainly to be counted as friends if not champions of 
liberalism, would not be at all disturbed by it, and would likely 
recommend that we own up to it without apology, the sooner the better.5 
 
 5. John Dewey, Philosophy and Democracy, 21 U. CAL. CHRON. 39 (1919), 
reprinted in JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 38 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro 
eds., 1993); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 44 (1989). 
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Second, I want to make use of a simple but important shorthand 
distinguishing two senses of the term value.  One sense, the “D”-sense, 
is purely descriptive.  The D-values of a person—or more generally, 
agent, including groups, societies, epochs, civilizations—refer to the 
ends actually pursued in life by such agents.  Values genuinely worthy 
of being pursued, that is, genuine goods, have normative value, hence, 
“N”-value.  Whether descriptive values are morally worthy or good—
normative—values is an open question.  Hence, D-values and N-values 
are not necessarily the same. 
The same difference can be applied to senses of the term pluralism.  
D-pluralism is the sense of the word pluralism most often encountered in 
writing about contemporary politics and culture.  It refers to the 
increasing social and cultural diversity, of many different types, that has 
come to characterize modern societies in an increasingly globalized 
world.  D-pluralism is empirical, a fact about the way we live together 
now.  D-pluralism is celebrated by some, bemoaned by others, but 
experienced by all.  The idea of value pluralism is not about D-
pluralism.  Value pluralism tells us that value, objective value, is not 
monistic but plural.  It thus tells us something about (a) the form of 
morality, and also something about (b) its rational character, namely 
that it is not relativistic but is rather a type of objective moral realism.  It 
does not tell us anything about the actual N-values in the world, except 
that they exist, that there is a plurality of them, and that there is not an 
infinite amount of them.  I assume that all value pluralists would accept 
the difference between D-value and N-value, and the difference between 
the ideas of D-pluralism and N-pluralism. 
III.  QUESTIONING THE BASIC CONNECTION 
A.  The Formality of N-Value in Value Pluralism 
Value pluralists posit the existence of a plurality of N-values, but 
ordinarily do not attempt to specify either (a) the number of N-values, or 
(b) the substance of these N-values, however many there are.  This is not 
objectionable in and of itself.  The formality of the idea does not prevent 
us from using it to reflect systematically on important metalevel 
questions regarding the nature of N-value, especially the question of 
whether N-value is fundamentally monistic or plural.  Indeed, the 
formality of the idea positively contributes to the careful consideration 
of such questions because it helps us not to lose sight of the 
metaquestions should they become entangled with the substantive ethical 
question of which substantive D-values are truly N-values.  There will, 
of course, be deep disagreement about that question, and not only 
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disagreement about the question of whether N-value itself is monistic or 
plural.  Formality helps us to keep our disagreements straight. 
But how far can we go with the purely formal ideal of N-value, 
especially if we want to examine the relationship between the theory of 
value and politics?  A number of my queries in the next section are 
derivative of that fundamental concern, and express in different ways a 
doubt that value pluralism as such can deliver much support for liberal 
political principles.  Consider a particular problem that arises for the 
value pluralist in this respect.  The fact that there is a plurality of D-
values in a society—say, seven—does not necessarily give us reason to 
affirm a set of familiar liberties designed to facilitate choice amongst 
these alternatives.  If we treat all of these D-values as N-values, then it 
seems true that the state would lack any obvious justification for limiting 
the liberty of citizens to choose amongst them.6  But we cannot cross 
that argumentative threshold without moving from the level of formality 
to that of substantive judgment.  This is a problem within the value 
pluralist framework—and not merely the point that whether value 
pluralism or an alternative like monism is the right philosophical view of 
value is a question that cannot be definitively answered for now.  That 
much is obvious, although one could think that mere phenomenological 
reflection upon human experience is enough to establish the truth of 
value pluralism.  I do not think it is.  Value pluralism is an interpretation 
of that experience, but so is monism, and indeed so is relativism.  All 
cannot be right, but experience itself is not enough to determine the 
matter for us. 
To return to the primary point: even from within the value pluralist 
framework, we do not know how many D-values are N-values without 
substantive argument about what is genuinely good and valuable.  
Without that information, we have no way to know how genuinely 
valuable it is to allow people to have the liberty to choose amongst a set 
of D-values.  If only one of the set of seven D-values is, in fact, an N-
value, then the liberty to choose among the whole range of seven is seen 
in a quite different light than would be the case if it were true that all 
seven of the D-values were N-values.  Bracketing for the moment the 
issue of whether there is value in choice itself, separate from the issue of 
 
 6. “Any obvious” as used here is a hedge to take account of the fact that a set of 
particular contextual factors, including extreme pressures on the survival of the polity, 
might provide such a justification. 
NEAL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:52 AM 
 
864 
whether the choices involve genuinely valuable goods, it certainly would 
seem that there is a significant difference in the two cases.  Limiting the 
liberty of choice in the case of one N-value and six D-values that lack 
genuine value would seem to be less objectionable—perhaps far less—
than limiting the liberty of choice amongst a plurality of genuinely good 
choices.  So how can we know how to value the liberty of choice—or at 
least value it overall—if we do not know whether we are dealing with D-
values or N-values? 
B.  The Slippage Between D-Pluralism and N-Pluralism 
One key reason it appears that value pluralism and liberalism are 
mutually supportive is that it seems like value pluralism is naturally 
capacious when it comes to respecting the legitimacy of different 
conceptions of the good and ways of life.  It is easy to imagine that if we 
affirm the idea of value pluralism, then we are affirming the legitimacy 
of difference on a “broad” or “wide” scale.  Consider this passage from 
Galston—where the term moral pluralism is standing in for value 
pluralism: 
I need not dwell on the relationship between expressive liberty and moral 
pluralism.  Suffice it to say that if moral pluralism is the most nearly adequate 
depiction of the moral universe we inhabit, then the range of choiceworthy 
human lives is very wide.  While some ways of life can be ruled out as violating 
minimum standards of humanity, most cannot.  If so, then the zone of human 
agency protected by the norm of expressive liberty is capacious indeed.7 
I agree with the judgments stated by Galston in this passage—there are a 
great many choiceworthy ways to lead a good human life—but when I 
try to reflect on why I believe this and how I might try to defend the 
view to someone skeptical about it, I gradually lose confidence that the 
idea of value pluralism itself would be of much help.  The key reason is 
simple: the form of the idea of value pluralism is not robust enough, not 
pregnant enough in meaning, if you will, to yield these conclusions.  
“Value pluralism” tells us about plurality and incommensurability, but it 
does not tell us about how much plurality and about how deep and 
confusing and befuddling it might be.  Without that kind of supplement, 
I cannot see that the thesis of value pluralism itself can do much work 
for us.  Is the idea of value pluralism adequate in the real world of 
diverse ways of living valuable human lives, what we might call N-
lives?  How could we even begin to answer until we have on hand some 
notion of what the contours of N-lives are?  And how could the idea of 
value pluralism itself give us that?  I cannot see that from the mere 
 
 7. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 37. 
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stipulation that value pluralism is the correct account of value, we can 
conclude that the “range of choiceworthy human lives is very wide.”  I 
do not have an alternative to offer in defense of Galston’s proposition 
with which I acknowledge agreeing; but I do not think the idea of value 
pluralism can be the kind of justification we need. 
The range of D-values and conceptions of the good in contemporary 
societies that respect expressive liberty is, I grant, wide.  But, value 
pluralism is not about D-value, and nothing in the idea of value 
pluralism itself necessitates that the range of N-value that is the heart of 
value pluralism be wide, or indeed similar, to the range of D-value. 
Crowder is very clear about this distinction.  He explicitly distinguishes 
“plurality of belief” from value pluralism: 
[V]alue pluralism is not mere “plurality of belief,” the idea that different people 
or groups of people believe different things.  This latter is the usual sense 
attached to the word “pluralism” in contemporary political theory.  But value 
pluralism in the sense that concerns me is not an empirical claim about the 
nature of current belief.  Rather, it is a claim about the true nature of morality 
independently of what some people may happen to believe. . . .  Consequently 
my argument that value pluralism grounds a case for liberalism should not be 
confused with the familiar claim that liberalism is justifiable as the most 
sensible response to modern divergence of belief about the good life.8 
That marks clearly the difference between D-value and N-value.  Yet 
Crowder also sometimes talks about N-value and the idea of value 
pluralism as if it were safe to assume that the range of allowable values 
and conceptions of the good encompassed by it were expansive.  For 
example, in defining the idea of plurality in value pluralism, he says that 
“the things that are valuable for human beings—including both universal 
and local values—are plural, or several.  Many different goods are 
required for human flourishing, not just one or a few . . . .”9  I agree with 
these judgments, but cannot see that the idea of value pluralism actually 
does much to support them.  Even if we accept that as a matter of 
definition, value pluralism means there are many goods required for 
human flourishing, and not just one or a few, it would seem that the 
important substantive question is what these goods are.  Now a supporter 
of value pluralism might say, “Well, of course such substantive 
knowledge—or our best estimate of it—is essential to political 
theorizing here, but we never said that such a supplement was not 
 
 8. CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 3. 
 9. Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
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necessary.  Your criticism is unfair if you take us to be claiming that the 
formal idea of value pluralism itself could do that much work.  Of 
course it could not, but we never claimed it could.”  I take the force of 
this reply, but my worry is that the formal idea of value pluralism is not 
doing any real work at all.  I think it often seems to only because we slip 
into supposing that there is a fairly robust correspondence between the 
range of politically significant D-values in the empirical polity under 
consideration and the range of N-values encompassed by the right 
account of value pluralism, whatever it is.  But there is no reason to 
suppose that. 
C.  Galston’s Value Pluralism Argument Against                                     
Single-Solution Illiberalism 
Consider the argument that value pluralism supports liberalism in the 
following way.  Galston writes: 
Value pluralism suggests that there is a range of indeterminacy within which 
various choices are rationally defensible, at least in the sense that they all fall 
above the Hampshire-Hart line of minimum decency.  Because there is no 
single uniquely rational ordering or combination of such values, no one can 
provide a generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular 
ranking or combination.  There is, therefore, no rational basis for restrictive 
policies whose justification includes the assertion that there is a unique rational 
ordering of value.  If value pluralism is correct, then as Steven Lukes puts it, 
“For the state to impose any single solution on some of its citizens is thus (not 
only from their standpoint) unreasonable.”10 
Consider two points.  First, the argument seems sound, but I do not see 
that it has much real significance in establishing the connection between 
value pluralism and liberalism.  We are assuming here that liberalism is 
constituted by the state refusing to impose on its citizens any single 
solution regarding value because it would be unreasonable to do so 
given the truth of value pluralism.  However, this argument would not 
reach states that imposed a single solution on grounds other than that 
solution being uniquely rational.  Many such grounds seem available; for 
example, the claim that the solution is in accord with the deepest and 
most important traditions of the community, or that it is a good way of 
maintaining social solidarity and therefore security.  It may even be, 
supposing the single solution is being sustained rather than invented, that 
the solution is an instantiation of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  
Moreover, suppose that the single solution being imposed is an N-value.  
It is true that value pluralism tells us that at least one other N-value must 
 
 10. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 57–58 (footnote 
omitted). 
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be being ignored, or repressed, in such a case, but the state would have 
some fairly powerful things to say in its own defense.  After all, it can 
give a reason for its imposition of the single value, and a pretty 
impressive reason—the value it is imposing is good, genuinely good, an 
N-value. 
Can we legitimately complain about value pluralism that it 
dangerously licenses this sort of reply by the single solution state insofar 
as it affirms the objective idea of the rational good, though insisting that 
this good is in fact a plurality of goods?  I do not think we can.  From the 
fact that someone subscribes to the view that values are objective and 
plural, I do not believe we can conclude anything about that person’s 
political principles or actions.  The same applies to state activity, it 
seems to me.  Because value is objective, it does not follow that we have 
to think it is a good idea to allow the state to act on the basis of appeal to 
that objective knowledge.  There is a long list of familiar reasons to 
which liberals and others have long appealed in this respect.  First and 
foremost would be the doubt that the state has any particular expertise in 
knowing these objective truths, coupled with the thought that it or its 
agents have powerful—and hence dangerous to citizens—incentives to 
feign knowledge of such truths when they actually fail to possess it.  
Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration constitutes a canonical expression 
of this argument.11  Note, however, that every argument used to defend 
value pluralism against such a charge can also be used to defend value 
monism.  There is no difference between them in terms of appealing to a 
notion of the objective rational good.  If that is a politically dangerous 
idea, then value pluralists are hardly any less threatening, simply as 
value pluralists, than monists are.  And if it is not a politically 
threatening idea, then value pluralists are off the hook, but so are 
monists. 
Still, even if it is correct to think that Galston’s argument above is 
limited in its reach and significance, it may be responded that his 
argument does engage and defeat one line of defense of nonliberalism, 
and a not insignificant one at that.  It seems to me plausible to interpret 
communist tyrannies as forms of polity that, at least sometimes, 
purported to justify themselves with the claim that their impositions, on 
what Galston terms the “expressive liberty” of citizens, represented the 
 
 11. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in 35 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 17 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
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rational truth about human value.12  Such a claim cannot be rendered 
consistent with value pluralism.  On the other hand, value pluralism does 
not do much by way of insuring nontyranny either, unless we are 
presupposing that the range of objective values encompassed by the true 
account of value pluralism is an extensive one.  If there are many N-
values, then a state imposing the single solution must be ignoring many 
of them, and presumably preventing people from living in accordance 
with them.  But, whether there are many or few N-values, not to mention 
what they actually are, is not something we can learn from value 
pluralism as such. 
D.  Value Pluralism Between Monism and Relativism 
Value pluralism is commonly portrayed as a view that is an alternative 
to both monism and relativism.  Yet it is, when one thinks about it, a 
somewhat odd contrast.  The key difference between value pluralism and 
monism is over the issue of whether the good is best understood as 
unitary or plural, but the key difference between value pluralism and 
relativism is over the issue of whether the good—whether plural or 
unitary—is objectively real or a matter of subjective taste or preference.  
There are two separate questions at issue here, not one question with 
three possible answers. 
We might describe the rhetorical stage upon which value pluralism  
makes its appearance this way.  Traditionally, there are two fundamentally 
opposed positions in metaethics.  One, moral realism, maintains that the 
nature of the good is properly understood as an objective matter.  Inquiry 
into the question of the good for human beings is rational inquiry into 
the nature of reality, an attempt to discern what is truly and genuinely 
good for human beings as such.  This goodness is understood to be 
something different than a simple description of what people believe, 
feel, perceive, or otherwise subjectively announce to be good; it is what 
really is good, whatever people may believe or prefer.  It is, in that 
sense, objective.  Opposed to this view about morality is the relativist 
view.  On this view, there is no such objectively real truth about moral 
matters to be discerned.  Beliefs about the good, moral beliefs generally, 
are properly understood as relative to some feature of the believer: his or 
her environment, social position, cultural identity, and so on.  Such 
beliefs do not admit of rational demonstration as something objectively 
true. 
Now in the history of Western philosophy, each position, rhetorically 
speaking, has a particular vulnerability.  The relativist position has been 
 
 12. GALSTON, PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM, supra note 2, at 45. 
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attacked since Plato for failing to take morality seriously—at best—and 
contributing to the development of bad moral character and the 
consequent corruption of society—anything goes—at worst.13  
Rhetorical attacks on the poor character of contemporary postmodernists 
are the current version of this age-old discourse.  On the other hand, the 
moral realists are vulnerable to the charge of intellectual narrow-
mindedness—at best—or the practical, political analogue of this—
tyranny—at worst.  They can be portrayed as narrow and pretentious in 
claiming to know what is good for human beings and practically 
dangerous insofar as they are moved to want to impose this alleged truth 
on recalcitrant human beings for their own good.  Now it is always 
possible to bite the bullet as an exponent of one of these positions, and to 
embrace the negative description of your enemy as your own.  Consider, 
for example, Richard Rorty’s artful rhetorical performances in the 
service of relativism14 or, on the other hand, the rhetorical stance of 
those fundamentalists, religious or secular, who are intent upon making 
all of us an offer we cannot refuse.  But for the most part, the dominant 
rhetorical response to the tension between the two positions is to affirm 
one while in one way or another denying that it actually is as vulnerable 
as it might appear to the bad consequences alleged to be endemic to it by 
adherents of the other positions.  So most relativists decline the “Rorty 
option” and instead prefer to go about demonstrating that they are not 
really the bad people the objectivists say they are, while most 
objectivists decline the fundamentalist option and insist instead that your 
freedom is safe with them, indeed perhaps only with them as opposed to 
those untrustworthy relativists.  Rhetorically, the weakness of each of 
these dominant responses is that they implicitly concede the case of their 
opponent.  The “responsible” relativist thereby acknowledges that there 
may well be something wrong with irresponsibility, and the 
nontyrannical objectivist has conceded that tyranny is something to be 
avoided.  So, there is plenty of fuel left to ignite the traditional forms of 
the rhetorical attack of each position upon the other.  Every relativist 
who demonstrates his own responsibility ensures that two of his cousins 
will be tarred and feathered as irresponsible, and every objectivist who 
demonstrates his open-mindedness and tolerance condemns his kin to 
the age-old charges. 
 
 13. See generally PLATO, GORGIAS (Donald J. Zeyl trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987). 
 14. RORTY, supra note 5. 
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Value pluralists occupy what appears to be a happy medium here.  
They take morality seriously, while at the same time recognizing that 
plurality is real and not merely apparent.  They are serious like the 
objectivists, but not vulnerable to the charge of tyranny; after all, they 
recognize that the good is not monistic, but diverse.  And, unlike the 
relativist, they cannot be charged with irresponsibility.  They, after all, 
take morality to be every bit as objective as the objectivist does.  Still, 
there are questions that linger. 
First, how different are value pluralists from monists?  The big 
difference between value pluralists and relativists is that value pluralists 
affirm the objectivity of the plural account of the good they endorse.  So 
do monists.  Traditionally, one of the most effective lines of argument 
advanced by relativists against monists is what might be labeled the 
“epistemological challenge.”  Like the man from Missouri, the relativists 
challenge the monists to “show me.”  Monists are asked not simply to 
express their endorsement of the position that the good is a matter of 
objective knowledge, but to demonstrate it.  This is notoriously difficult 
to do.  Reasonable people disagree not only about whether it can be 
done, but whether it has been done.  I have nothing to say directly to this 
issue.  Rather, I want to point out something that I think is important, 
though easily overlooked, in discussions of value pluralism.  The 
epistemological challenge facing the value pluralist is every bit as great 
as that facing the monist, however great one may assess that challenge to 
be.  The difficulty of demonstrating the objective goodness of some 
plural number of ways of life or values is no less difficult than that of 
demonstrating the objective goodness of what some monists claim is the 
single best way of life.  It is not true that the challenge is greater for the 
monist than it is for the value pluralist. 
Value pluralists commonly invoke illustrative examples of arguably 
good lives in the course of explaining their ideas.  So, for example, it 
might be said that the life of the (a) Christian saint and that of the (b) 
Homeric warrior are two objectively valuable modes of life, and that the 
pluralist has the advantage over the monist insofar as he can recognize 
this.  A monist would have to defend the view that (a) is good and (b) is 
not, or that (b) is good and (a) is not, or that neither (a) nor (b) is good, 
though some (c) is.  What about the value pluralist?  True, he does not 
have to deny the goodness of either (a) or (b), but he does have to defend 
the view that both (a) and (b) are objectively good and not bad.  This 
seems to me no less difficult, epistemologically, than the challenge 
facing the monist. 
A second, and related, issue is that the notion of a plurality of 
objectively good lives would, ultimately, have to be specified and 
defended in a way that again seems every bit as demanding as the 
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philosophical task confronting the monist.  The plurality of good lives 
entertained by the pluralist is finite.  Not all ways of life/values are good, 
and ultimately the pluralist owes an account of how to demarcate the line 
between the two and how to know which particular lives/values fall on 
either side of the line.  Another way to put it is this: there is a great 
plurality of possible value pluralisms, depending on the number and the 
substance of the true values posited.  From the point of view of a 
concern with principles of right political order, almost everything hinges 
on these features of the particular brand of value pluralism under 
consideration.  Very little if anything actually hinges on the general 
nature of value pluralism itself. 
IV.  CROWDER’S DIVERSITY ARGUMENT FROM VALUE                    
PLURALISM TO LIBERALISM 
Along with Galston, George Crowder has made the most sustained 
particular efforts at defending the connection between value pluralism 
and liberalism.  In this section, I consider one key line of argument that 
Crowder develops in his attempt to establish the connection.  This is the 
“diversity argument,” and Crowder divides it into two steps, each of 
which I will now consider.  The first draws an “ethic of diversity” from 
the core idea of value pluralism.  The second then moves from that ethic 
to a set of liberal political principles. 
A.  From Value Pluralism to Diversity 
Crowder reasons that “[t]o accept value pluralism is to accept that there 
are universal goods and that these are many and incommensurable.”15  
Further, he argues that to “accept” the existence of these goods is not 
merely to “allow” them, but also to “endorse” them.16  This makes sense 
because while we might, pragmatically, have to allow a range of D-
goods as a practical necessity, we would not think that constituted a 
reason to endorse or support them.  The fact that they were N-goods, 
however, would be such a reason.  As Crowder puts it, “from the 
pluralist point of view, the universal goods are not merely values that, a 
matter of fact, some people happen to hold.  Rather, the pluralist sees 
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 16. Id. 
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them as goods that contribute to human flourishing objectively.”17  He 
then argues that because value pluralists are committed to human 
flourishing, they must be committed to “promoting the various goods 
that contribute to that flourishing.”18  This, too, seems a legitimate move, 
though a potential problem begins to emerge here.  Given the plural 
nature of the good, we know that the value pluralist will have more than 
one way in which he can “promote” flourishing.  Moreover, we know 
that he will not be able to directly compare and “weigh” these various 
possibilities because of the reality of incommensurability.  There is no 
metric by which competing packages of objective goods, all of which 
can be said to contribute to human flourishing, can be comparatively 
weighed.  So someone committed to flourishing will know that he 
should promote objective goods and not bads, but he will not know 
which goods, or package of goods, to promote, at least in any abstract 
and generally applicable way. 
B.  The Equal Value Postulate 
The next step in the argument invites more questions.  Crowder argues 
that “[f]urthermore, the pluralist must endorse all such goods equally, in 
the sense that they have an equal claim on us until we are presented with 
a particular context in which we must choose among them.”19  In effect, 
the point is that incommensurability prevents us from having a rational 
basis for choice amongst goods, or from knowing which goods are most 
conducive to human flourishing.  Only knowledge of the context, 
historical and social, within which the choice is being made would give 
us some potential guidance about how to proceed.  It seems to me that 
the proper way to describe the state of affairs here is to say that we have 
no reason to attach any comparative value to any of the objective goods, 
not to say that we have reason to value them equally.  In effect, we have 
no reason to value them equally or unequally.  The point may seem 
merely semantic, but I think it is more significant than that. 
Crowder is certainly aware of the potential difficulty here.  He writes: 
“The plural goods are incommensurable, and so cannot be said to be 
equal according to any measure, but they are, as Berlin puts it, ‘equally 
ultimate.’”20  No explanation is given of this idea of Berlin’s that the 
goods are “equally ultimate.”  I was puzzled by this apparently 
nonmetrical notion of equal valuation of each good that is based on their 
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status as “ultimate.”  Checking the context of Berlin’s passage—which 
comes from the famous Two Concepts of Liberty essay—to which 
Crowder refers here does not help much.  Berlin is there emphasizing the 
“necessity and agony” of choice amongst “equally ultimate” values, 
arguing that this explains why “men place such immense value upon the 
freedom to choose.”21  Knowing—insofar as they are value pluralists—
that the values cannot be reconciled and mutually realized in a possible 
utopian situation, men, as Berlin portrays them here, insist upon the 
value of being able to choose for themselves which set of irreconcilable 
values they will pursue.  But as I read him, the point is about the 
“ultimacy” of these allegedly “equally ultimate” values, and the agony 
of the tragic choices that follow, rather than about their “equality” in a 
sense that would stand as an argument for the position Crowder is 
defending.  It is of course possible that I have missed a relevant sense of 
equal that is actually there in either Crowder’s or Berlin’s formulation.  
Still, the incommensurability postulate of value pluralism would seem to 
undercut a general attribution of equality to a range of values. 
The significance of the equal value postulate in terms of Crowder’s 
overall argument can be seen in the next step of his argument.  He says 
that from their status of being valued equally, “[i]t follows that the 
pluralist outlook commits us to valuing the full range of human 
goods.”22  This is a crucial step.  The argument is going to require us to 
endorse a larger rather than a smaller range of objective goods—N-
goods.  But it is not clear why this should be so.  We are interested in the 
way in which these goods contribute to human flourishing, and we have 
no way to know that “more is better” when it comes to N-goods.  
Incommensurability prevents that.  It might be that endorsing a package 
of N-goods (X) that is “larger” than another package (Y) would 
contribute to human flourishing to a greater degree.  However, only if 
we knew that the values were metrically equal would it become 
plausible to entertain the idea that more is better.  Without the equal 
value postulate, we would not have a case for endorsing a “larger” 
package of values over a “smaller” one, and without that endorsement, a 
crucial link in the chain of argument is endangered.  Crowder will argue 
that liberalism does a better job than alternative political views of 
 
 21. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIBERTY 166, 
213–14 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
 22. CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 137. 
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fulfilling the aim of “valuing the full range of human goods.”23  I will 
argue later that there are problems with this spatial way of conceiving 
liberalism.  But even if it were to prove sound, we would not have a 
reason for thinking that the best political system is one that protects the 
“widest” or “largest” set of human values, unless we also had reason to 
accept the equal value postulate.  The best political system will 
presumably be one that promotes human flourishing to a degree greater 
than the alternatives at hand.  But, we will not be able to know what 
flourishing is and how well it is promoted by looking at the range or 
number of values that a given polity endorses or secures.  We are stuck 
with the difficulty of looking at the substance of what is promoted and 
foregone. 
Crowder does provide another reason, separate from the equal value 
postulate, in support of his view that value pluralism leads to valuing 
diversity.  He writes: 
To acknowledge the truth of value pluralism is to acknowledge a multiplicity of 
genuine goods, of diverse natures, not merely ethical mistakes with which it is 
nevertheless best not to interfere.  It is to acknowledge a duty to promote those 
goods so far as possible: a duty to promote diversity.24 
This makes it seem as if the critic were denying the value-pluralism-to-
diversity link because the critic denied the objective goodness—the N-
goodness—of the various goods at hand.  But the criticism I am raising 
does not deny this.  Rather, the point is that we have no reason to believe 
that flourishing is better supported by the endorsement of a wider rather 
than a less wide range of N-goods in a particular society.  The issue of 
the goods themselves being objective and not mere ethical mistakes is 
beside the point. 
C.  Maximization and Coherence 
In denying the equal value postulate, I am questioning whether one 
can generate a value pluralist defense of diversity that is, as it were, 
quantitative and nonsubstantive.  Because we cannot know that more is 
better in terms of promoting human flourishing, we cannot build a 
defense of liberal political principles on the idea that liberalism is 
superior to alternative political theories because it is “wider,” “more 
spacious,”  “more open,” or “less restrictive.”  I will label this idea the 
“spatial” conception of liberalism.  One attraction of the spatial idea is 
that it seems to provide a means of defending liberalism without 
invoking substantive claims about the good.  I do not think the spatial 
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idea of liberalism is an illuminating one, and I do not think that defenses 
of liberalism that appeal to it are attractive ones. 
Crowder is aware of this problem and does present an interesting 
argument to counter it.  I am skeptical that the argument succeeds.  
Crowder acknowledges that “[a]n ethic that consisted merely in 
maximizing the number of values to be pursued would be hard to 
distinguish from other maximization ethics. . . .  Such an ethic would be 
in conflict with the fundamental pluralist injunction to attend to the 
distinctiveness of values.”25  He continues: 
This would be a serious problem if the ethic of diversity I am proposing 
amounted merely to an injunction to promote “more rather than fewer” values 
or “as many as possible.”  But this kind of quantitative consideration—how 
many values?—is only one aspect of what I have in mind.  The maximizing 
dimension of the ethic of diversity must be supplemented by a second kind of 
consideration, that of balance or coherence among the values to be promoted.  
Sheer multiplication of different goods must be tempered by attention to the 
content of those goods and to the relations among them, since some may impede 
others.  The diversity implied by pluralism is therefore best understood as 
involving both a quantitative and a qualitative element, both a requirement of a 
generous range of values and a requirement that the values within that range 
should be tolerably coherent with one another.  The ethic of diversity embraces 
both “multiplicity” and “coherence.”26 
From this it might seem that Crowder has abandoned the spatial 
defense of liberalism and acknowledged the unavoidable substantive 
nature of the question of the good.  However, “coherence” turns out 
itself to be, on Crowder’s rendering, a kind of supplement to the 
maximizing idea rather than an actual departure from it.  Let me explain 
by advancing two doubts about the argument above. 
First, note that the maximizing aspect of the diversity argument is not 
abandoned, but is instead reaffirmed in this passage. It is not maximizing 
that is identified as the problem, but maximizing unsupplemented by 
considerations of coherence.  But the burden of the previous section was 
to argue that no coherent account of what it could mean to maximize 
incommensurable values can be given here, once we reject the equal 
value postulate.  In this passage, Crowder introduces the notion of value 
pluralism “involving” a requirement of a “generous range of values,” but 
“generous” is here functioning as another spatial term that is 
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unfounded.27  Whether a “generous” range of values is more conducive 
to human flourishing than an “ungenerous” range is an unanswerable 
question.  It depends on the substance of the values in question and upon 
the nature of the relations between them.  Crowder does, it is true, 
recognize that last point insofar as he introduces the necessity of 
attending to “coherence” among values when evaluating alternatives, but 
the point I wish to emphasize here is that the fact that coherence should 
be taken into account does not give us a reason for taking multiplicity 
into account.  In other words, if, as I hold, the maximizing idea of 
multiplicity is groundless from a pluralist point of view, it does not 
become any more grounded or persuasive because it is supplemented by 
another criterion—coherence.  However strong the case for coherence 
may be, and I agree that it is a strong one, it does not strengthen the case 
for multiplicity.  In my view, the alleged pluralist case for multiplicity 
remains ungrounded. 
Second, there is a peculiarity about the idea that the criterion of 
coherence adds a qualitative element to the otherwise quantitative nature 
of the multiplicity criterion.  The core idea behind the coherence 
criterion is the recognition that “the content of the values pursued must 
fit together within a horizon of real possibility for the individual or 
society concerned, given the person’s or the society’s experience and 
identity.”28  Moreover, “in addition to being realistic prospects, the 
values in question should not be so widely scattered or fragmented that 
their pursuit can only be half-hearted or self-defeating.  The goods 
should therefore cohere sufficiently that all may be taken seriously.”29  
Let us call these the “practicality” and “nonfragmentary” conditions of 
the criterion of coherence.  Now both conditions make good sense.  
However, the problem is that they are so reasonable that they undermine 
any appeal that the maximizing criterion of multiplicity has.  In other 
words, the conditions of coherence introduced by Crowder may serve to 
undermine the quantitative criterion, not serve as a supplement to it.  
This is because the conditions of coherence are sensible just because 
they show us that it is not the range—in terms of quantitative space—of 
values that matters, but rather the degree to which a given range—
whatever its absolute spatial extent—has enough practicality and unity 
to lead to human flourishing to a greater degree than some alternative 
range. 
Now that last statement sounds as if it invokes a quantitative 
concept—“greater or lesser flourishing”—but I am not sure that it does.  
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Flourishing is the conceptual term Crowder has chosen to designate the 
end-state that we are pursuing in terms of deciding which values to 
support as social evaluators, and the crucial point about it is precisely 
that it is nonquantitative, while nevertheless being objective.  We cannot 
figure out how to “maximize” flourishing; in a way, the use of 
flourishing is itself testimony to this fact.  We could imagine maximizing 
“utility” or some other commensurating concept, but as value pluralists, 
we have to eschew the use of such concepts.  Flourishing is the peculiar 
concept with which we are left.  It is a concept trying to perform two 
functions at once.  It commensurates at a very high level of abstraction 
lower level concepts that are supposed to be incommensurable—so it 
both “commensurates” and “fails to commensurate” at once.  Speaking 
of flourishing commensurates insofar as it implies that different 
packages of values can be comparatively assessed in terms of the twin 
criteria of multiplicity and coherence to determine which package better 
supports the end-state of flourishing.  But it fails to commensurate 
insofar as we realize that we cannot carry these comparative evaluations 
out in any kind of quantifiable or quantifying way.  Value pluralism is 
consistent with the idea that we can distinguish the good from the bad, 
but it does not seem to me consistent with the idea that we can 
distinguish the greater from the lesser amount of good. 
Crowder comes close to acknowledging the way in which coherence 
undermines rather than supplements multiplicity when he describes what 
remains of the criterion of multiplicity once we grant that considerations 
of coherence must be taken into account.  He writes: 
[T]he ideal of diversity implied by the pluralist outlook cannot be captured 
solely by the idea of maximizing a range of values.  Once again there is a need 
for choices to be made, choices that require guidance of a qualitative nature.  
That is not to say that considerations of quantity are irrelevant to pluralist 
diversity, since the narrowing of available values to a very small range is 
clearly at variance with the pluralist outlook.  Pluralist diversity implies support 
for at least some generous range of goods as available goals for individuals and 
societies.30 
For all intents and purposes, this final formulation leaves the criterion 
of multiplicity empty.  Even granting Crowder’s qualifying point that 
“[w]hat exactly that range should be is, of course, not something that can 
be expressed in a precise formula applicable to all cases,”31 it is hard to 
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see what evaluative work the criteria could actually do.  The “very small 
range” of values that would definitively violate the criteria is, in effect, 
the range of one, that is, monism.  For we cannot know that a range of 
even only two values would be inferior in terms of promoting human 
flourishing to some alternative set of more than two; the quantitative 
comparison will simply not tell us what we need to know.  Crowder is 
right in my view to introduce the qualitative criterion of coherence into 
the discussion, but wrong in holding that the quantitative criterion of 
multiplicity can be sustained once this introduction is made.  Value 
pluralism, it seems to me, teaches us that the question of the good is 
qualitative “all the way down.”32 
My conclusion is that the connection between value pluralism and 
diversity maintained by Crowder does not hold up.  The equal value 
postulate cannot be used to sustain the view that more is better when it 
comes to the relation between quantity of values and human flourishing.  
The coherence criteria, I have argued, serves to undermine rather than 
supplement or support the view that the width of the range of values 
endorsed in a society is an indicator of the degree to which that society 
enables human flourishing. 
D.  From Diversity to Liberalism 
Suppose that I am wrong and Crowder is right about the relationship 
between value pluralism and diversity.  Let us examine the second step 
in his argument from diversity in support of the view that value 
pluralism generates a case for liberalism.  This is the claim that the 
principle of diversity generates a case for liberalism.  I want to consider 
this argument in detail because I believe it constitutes an example of the 
spatial form of argument that I fear does not serve liberalism well.  The 
essence of it is to try to defend liberalism not by means of affirming 
substantively the type of human life or lives to which it predominantly 
gives rise—as superior to some alternative set yielded by an alternative 
form of political order—but rather by claiming that liberalism is in some 
spatial sense—“wider,” “broader,” “more capacious,” “less restraining,” 
“open,” et cetera—more appropriately accommodating of diversity than 
its rivals, however defined.  In short, it is a form of argument that 
appeals to quantity as a substitute for qualitative judgment about the 
good when comparatively evaluating political orders.  I am skeptical that 
any such argument can ultimately be sustained. 
Crowder’s form of the spatial argument is a thoughtful one.  He 
frames the defense of the liberal political order as a respecter of diversity 
 
 32. See id. at 5. 
NEAL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:52 AM 
[VOL. 46:  859, 2009]  The Path Between 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 879 
in terms of its “‘approximate[]’ neutral[ity].”33  Approximate neutrality 
is a more modest version of whole neutrality.  Crowder criticizes the 
doctrine of whole neutrality.  Whether whole neutrality is conceived as 
neutrality of impact of policy upon different ways of life or as neutrality 
of reasons justifying political policy, it is a highly unlikely possibility in 
Crowder’s view: “[I]t is doubtful whether any form of liberalism can be 
wholly neutral, either in impact or reasons.”34  Note, though, that 
Crowder does not conceive neutrality as an impossibility, but rather as a 
highly unlikely but nevertheless coherent empirical possibility.  Whole 
neutrality in his view is possible but highly unlikely; hence, it makes 
sense to imagine it as a desired endpoint that one could approach to a 
greater or lesser degree.  His defense of liberalism is in terms of such an 
approach.  He claims that liberalism, while certainly not wholly neutral, 
is nevertheless “‘approximately’ neutral, that is, more neutral or 
accommodating than the alternative political forms.”35  Liberalism, he 
claims, “provides the best political framework because it leaves more 
space for the flourishing of multiple and diverse goods than any known 
or realistically imagined alternative.”36  In a similar formulation, he says 
that: 
The pluralist ethic of diversity can realistically require no more than that the 
political ranking endorsed by a given society be as accommodating to diversity 
as possible in the circumstances and more accommodating than the alternatives.  
Liberals should concede that liberalism is not unlimited in its capacity to 
accommodate diversity, but they can plausibly argue that the diversity ethic is 
more fully satisfied by liberal principles and institutions than by any other.37 
Does liberalism provide more “space” in the requisite sense than any 
“known or realistically imagined alternative”?  Crowder’s answer is yes, 
but I am skeptical, not so much because I think the answer is no as 
because I am not sure it is the right question. 
The space we are metaphorically speaking of here is space for the 
plural good, that is to say, space for N-goods.  We are imagining not the 
space available for alternative values and modes of life generally, that is, 
D-goods, but rather the space available for that subset of this general set 
that we know to be objectively good.  Now there is, I think, a certain 
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level of plausibility to the “liberalism provides more space” idea when 
we are talking about the general category of D-values without regard to 
their objective goodness or badness.  I grant the general idea that liberal 
political orders are, relatively speaking, morally permissive, and the 
public/private split—in whatever particular historical configuration it 
takes and however fragmented it may be—characteristic of such orders 
can be understood as generating space available for individuals to pursue 
different D-conceptions of a valuable life.  But this is space for the 
morally bad as well as for the morally good; let us say, for “B”-
conceptions of the good—morally bad conceptions of the good—as well 
as for N-conceptions.  The fact, if it is one, that liberalism provides 
“more space” in this sense does not give us reason to conclude that the 
good of human flourishing is served by liberalism and the space it 
provides relative to an alternative.  To know that, we would need to have 
substantive knowledge of the nature of the good—plural and objective—
and we would need to see how well liberalism did relative to alternatives 
in terms of nurturing it.  The point is that knowing that liberalism 
provides more space for value choice of D-goods than an alternative 
does not help us to know whether liberalism is more supportive of 
human flourishing, that is, N-goods, than that alternative.  After all, that 
liberal space might enable more flowers to bloom, but it might also 
enable more weeds to grow, some of which might prevent flowers from 
growing.  So in this case, the spatial idea of liberalism is—or so I have 
suggested—conceptually plausible, but unhelpful in terms of providing a 
reason in support of liberalism. 
On the other hand, consider the spatial idea in the context of thinking 
about the subset of N-values only, not the general set of all D-values.  
Here, the spatial idea is conceptually implausible.  How could we know 
that liberalism provides more space for the N-good than that provided by 
some alternative political order?  Nothing about the spatial attributes of 
liberalism—or its alternatives—could help us to know this.  The thing 
that would help us to make an evaluation such as this would be 
substantive knowledge of the good—knowledge about which values and 
ways of life purported to be good by various individuals and groups 
actually were objectively good.  The spatial idea of liberalism would add 
nothing to this.  Here again, we have no reason to think that more is 
necessarily better.  Only if we believed that allowing quantitatively more 
D-value choices tended to yield more good choices of N-value overall 
would we have reason to affirm the spatial defense of liberalism from a 
value pluralist point of view.  But I do not see how we could know that, 
especially if we had reason to think that the bad need not simply 
peacefully coexist alongside the good, but might also thwart and inhibit 
the development of the good.  In short, and to repair to the gardening 
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metaphor one last time, if we desire a flourishing garden, we will have to 
do something other than look for the largest plot of land and grant 
permission for a hundred flowers to bloom.  Defending liberalism in 
terms of its “approximate neutrality” while criticizing the idea of “whole 
neutrality” is like saying that even if the best garden is not infinitely 
large, the larger garden is the better garden.  But size and quantity are 
not the appropriate tools of evaluation here. 
Moreover, spatial concepts are no more effective as criticisms of 
alternatives to liberalism than they are as pillars of support for it.  
Crowder defends liberalism indirectly by arguing that it responds to the 
truth of pluralist diversity in a balanced way that makes it superior to the 
extremes of too little concern for diversity—this is said to be the vice of 
a number of political views, including Marxism, anarchism, socialism, 
communitarianism, and conservatism—or a wanton overconcern for 
diversity—said to be the vice of postmodernism.  Liberalism, on the 
other hand, is said to have “a strong claim to be seen as striking the 
required balance between multiplicity and coherence, and therefore to 
satisfying the requirements of pluralist diversity.”38  There is much to be 
said, and much of great interest that has been said, both for and against 
these various political views; in a sense, the consideration of them, in all 
of their substantive detail, is a considerable part of the traditional 
enterprise of political theory.  I cannot see that assessing them in the 
spatial terms employed here is of much help in coming to a sustained 
judgment about them—or about liberalism, for that matter.  Thus, for 
example, postmodernists are charged with “ethical incoherence” for 
promiscuously “promoting multiple values without regard to what these 
values are and how they relate to one another. . . .  The fostering of 
otherness or difference cannot by itself be an adequate criterion for 
public policy.”39  On the other hand, conservatism is treated as guilty of 
the opposite spatial vice, that of being overly narrow and insufficiently 
broad in terms of its response to the truth of value pluralism.  Crowder 
portrays conservatives as confronting the dilemma of choice in the face 
of value pluralism by repairing to an insistence “on an adherence to local 
tradition which is excessively narrow.”40  Conservatives, like liberals 
and unlike postmodernists, appreciate the need for coherence to temper 
 
 38. Id. at 145. 
 39. Id. at 144–45. 
 40. Id. at 149. 
NEAL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:52 AM 
 
882 
multiplicity when it comes to the question of responding to value 
pluralism.  Unlike liberals, however, conservatives, in appealing to local 
tradition as the source of guidance in value choice, are said to “rest[] on 
an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the context required for 
pluralist choice, and [are] neglectful of universal norms.”41  
Conservatives are thus mistaken insofar as they practice a “rigid 
insistence on local tradition”—is it the rigidity that is the problem?—and 
fail to realize that “[p]luralist diversity requires that limits be placed on 
multiplicity, but existing traditions are not coextensive with those 
limits.”42  So: conservatives are too narrow, and postmodernists are too 
wide.  Liberals are just right, spatially measured. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have presented a number of arguments here that call into question 
the strength of the linkage between value pluralism and liberal political 
morality.  I have focused attention on the idea of value pluralism, saying 
little about the details of the idea of liberal political morality.  
Ultimately, our overall view of the relationship between value pluralism 
and liberalism would need to take full account of the plurality of 
liberalisms.  Galston’s “reformation” liberalism, for example, is quite 
different from the enlightenment version of liberalism that privileges a 
robust conception of individual autonomy.43  Crowder’s brand of 
liberalism partakes of both strains and is interesting in its attempt to 
synthesize them.  Although I believe that Galston’s idea of a reformation 
liberalism stressing tolerance over autonomy is the preferable model of 
political liberalism, I have tried to explain here why I have doubt that the 
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